If a new contract would be needed, what is the estimated cost, including audits to make that happen?
I’m not sure that cost is explicitly called out in this proposal.
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its not. but estimate given by def1 is 100k? (if i read his post right)
Def something to look at, after we get this out of the way. see if interest is achieved.
(im thinking best way if its moved forward, is then to do a planning stage, rough costs) then do another snapshot setup.
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I still feel like this proposal should undergo more incubation to further define and specify the flow and mechanics of the staking/distribution aspects and why this proposal is confident the final numbers presented are of benefit to the DAO, FOX token, and FOX holders. of this proposal in the very least.
I do not understand and have not seen any presented success/failure metrics based around this proposal. I have seen a few mentions of monitoring and changing the currently specified percentages and numbers of RUNE allocated, FOX buyback and burn, the remainder to hodl, and the amount of time needed to un-stake FOX earning RUNE. As worded currently, the proposal states:
If these are all variables (I added time needed to un-stake as I think it’s important to the equation and could be an area of attack I alluded to in my last comment.) that can be modified by governance in future proposals, what does success and failure look like for each of these specific areas of the proposal? It would be really helpful to the strength and support of this proposal if more work/modeling/ideation was done around the consequences of each of these areas of the proposal. How do we know that splitting 50% of the DAO’s revenue is enough to quote:
Knowing at a high level what the success and failure metrics for all of these feels like a bare minimum due diligence. In my opinion as a community member and Workstream Leader having data to prove why these numbers have been selected for the proposal would be received a lot better than the current feels index presentation.
To me, a proposal that would need follow up proposals to define itself seems like a clear example of a poorly defined or not specific proposal. The incubation or RFC stage has been used to do what you have pushed into ideation and potentially will push through as multiple proposals. I get there is excitement as well as time spent waiting for others to comment, but no real debates and measurable data have been presented in response to the questions presented by @0xFBL, myself and other community members taking part in the process.
Length of time needed to unstake and un-staking costs/penalties is pretty specific. I feel like there have been a few conversations discussing this idea and it makes sense to highlight and ask why this ideation proposal came to the 28 day cliff for staking as its final decision on this number. If 28 days is the right choice, how did we come to that and how would we know if it needs to be shorter or longer?
Something parametric that has staking time locks calculated in relation to either the % of the pool your stake represents, to the value of both FOX, RUNE, and % redeemable at any given time seems like something that could use a good tire kick and explore data findings of before moving forward in an official vote. It might in the very least give us an idea of how to measure the success of the number or function ultimately chosen here.
You’re allowed to continue to think it’s affect on the runway is negligible or dismissive. You should expect to continue to receive pushback and feelings contrary from contributors who view it as an additional cost and liability, further dragging on our runway because it technically is one. One that will continue to grow in cost to the DAO if we are ultimately successful or will be a bleed out of our biggest current revenue generator to the FOX blessed while we starve in the desert looking for PMF and the next bull.
The runway/expenses doom and existential threat is so front of mind it takes away cycles from every contributor to the DAO and has rippling affects on staffing, stability, camaraderie, and culture of the DAO. The spreadsheet says with our new TWAPs we have the same meme ‘8-12 months’, however Leadership and Tokenomics had to perform miracles to assure a liquidity of stablecoins were available for budgets recently in a manner that did not suggest the same confidence. The runway meme has gotten it’s lore from the diligence of the work of the contributors maintaining organization and order, not because crypto is gonna crypto. It will not be the end of the runway next month to cut the current revenue in half, and by that same thinking, the change in FOX tokenomics brought via burn should be considered in the same negligible light on the positive side for FOX tokenomics.
If there were some form of variables or mechanics in this staking mechanism, or at the core of the distribution function that actually drove a revenue generating action that could benefit the DAO’s revenues I could see this actually being a -dare I say it- Flywheel. But not as currently constructed, as written it is the DAO making it 50% harder to generate revenue from our most successful revenue generating service yet and I am not sure as to why. There has not been a strong enough connection made between the source generating the assets you’d like dispersed and those that would be collecting it.
There is another point of the proposal that has not gotten much attention that I think is deserving of some:
I am not going to speak for the multi-sig signers but perhaps they could make anonymous accounts here to voice their opinions. I do know that it is a high risk, thankless, and underpaid position currently. The TMDC can speak to their current relationship with the signers and what an ask of an increase in individual transactions that need to be verified, queued, and signed by the current signers of this magnitude would mean to the current load of transactions maintained by the signers.
The idea of a service that is built to maintain sending transactions on time also feels out of scope, pricy, prone to risk, and a future maintenance burden that would cost the DAO more resources, cycles, and time from Engineering, Product and Operations.
I think there is more than enough feedback from @0xFBL, myself, @kent, @0xdef1cafe, @woody and others to strongly consider doing more research, presenting more data, and being open to discovery on new ways to consider a tokenomics proposal upgrade rather than the current presented proposal. It feels impulsive and naive to me that we are at this place with this potentially going to governance as written with this level of direct feedback in the forums. Perhaps we did not learn enough hard lessons from FOXy or the FOX farming incentivization programs.
I would love to see some modeling on the affects of the sell pressure of FOX versus the buy pressure the burn could create. To me it seems like we are creating much more sell pressure with the treasury also needing to sell FOX to make up the lost revenue from RUNE dispersement. Are there any modeling that has been done (perhaps in tandem with the TMDC) that forecast additional sell/buy pressure and scenarios that the DAO might see ourselves forcing on the FOX token.
I agree with these lists of pros and cons associated with the proposal as currently written and have not been provided with data or evidence that runs contrary in the current threads of this discussion.
I don’t think that my current view on a tokenomics upgrade akin to this will forever be a not yet, but I still feel I align with this overall:
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Thank you so many folks for continuing this spirited discussion on the all various sides of this proposal and debate. I love seeing the engagement and interest from so many folks about this subject. It’s also encouraging to see so many intelligent voices of agreement and dissent, I welcome all of it and hopefully all these additional perspectives will end up making any official proposal that goes forward for vote a much better one for it.
When I first made the RFC post, my hope was whether or not this proposal ends up moving forward that at the very least the DAO would engage in a important discussion around FOX tokenomics and possible ways to improve. It was something I voiced during the SCP 153 debate as a missing component of that proposal in order to actually upgrade the tokenomics and I am glad the idea is now getting more of the attention it deserves.
Similar to SCP 153 (and the prior fee debate), I think there are some high level strategic details about which way the DAO should or shouldn’t go that are going to inevitably be contentious. I don’t view the contention as a bad thing, but a healthy indicator that the subject matter at least is on track. As a result, at a certain point governance needs to weigh in and help settle contentious points within the community as it has before.
On that note there are some aspects that are coming up repeatedly (both on and off the forum) where reasonable and well-intentioned folk may simply disagree:
- Some folks in this discussion believe that “now” is the right time for a tokenomic upgrade like this and others believe it is not the right time.
- Some are very concerned about the impact this could have on the DAO’s treasury and view it as high risk/cost, others believe it is a minimal impact with low risk/cost
- Some think the proposal needs more research, modeling, metrics and details before being submitted to ideation. Others think the discussion and what has been presented to this point to be more than sufficient to move forward with an ideation vote.
- Some think the initial starting parameters are about right/too low and others think they are too high.
I think everyone has good reasons for believing what they do from their perspective in regards to these points and so I won’t continue to push further and explicate/repeat on those areas where the contention likely needs to be settled by vote, the current ideation vote will give us a good sentiment gauge of where the proposal stands among the community before any next steps.
A few brief things to add from some of the latest discussion:
Well in my mind having to stake a small cap volatile asset for a minimum of 28 days is not at all “risk free” for a variety of reasons.
There are a number of different perspectives around the burn mechanism, some in crypto swear by it and some hate it, maybe this is another of those contentious areas that is bound to affect perspectives, but i don’t think this description is somehow the “only” viable burn model. Many tokens have and use burns effectively even if they are not “cash flow” positive (and arguably a number of those have used such models to help them achieve growth and positive cashflow). I think burning has potential value for FOX holders, but I understand that some just don’t want to see a burn at all. One question is do those folks think something like “buyback” or “buyback and lock” is better or should the bucket just be eliminated? To me those seem pretty strictly worse from a tokenomics perspective though maybe the difference isn’t enough to matter at the scale we are expecting early on?
I think this perspective misses the forrest for the trees in many ways that have been discussed, but also understand where it comes from and I thank @0xdef1cafe for giving such clear articulation to this viewpoint. Ultimately if you feel similarly to this its prob not about the specifics and you just disagree with the mechanism fundamentally and thus should vote this down.
Enough people seem to see the merit in the proposal though that I think it is worth the discussion and ideation vote at minimum.
By no means do I consider this iteration of the tokenomics upgrade “done” or “complete” if it passes, I expect there will inevitably be alterations, additions, changes, and more as the DAO iterates on top of this foundation. In fact, this was said in the RFC post and in this iteration of the proposal that the aim is to setup a new foundation for FOX tokenomics which can be bult on top of.
What I do think, that @seven7hwave 's puts nicely here a few different ways is that the risk/reward seems worth the attempt/experiment - and ultimately this is one of the strongest arguments to vote for this. If you think the risk/reward seems worth it, its likely you want to vote this up, and if you don’t think that risk/reward is worth it you likely will want to vote this down.
@seven7hwave you are correct that the burn aspect is not core to this proposal, it could be completely eliminated if that is what the community prefers. I think it does add value, but the proposal also works fine without it. As currently stands if this proposal does move forward I would make sure to delineate a “0 % burn” option as one of the starting parameter options that the DAO could vote on.
Ultimately the engineering and product workstreams would need to work on this if it was passed and implement the details as they see fit, there has been an estimate done though by the current interim engineering workstream lead who posted it on the RFC thread: [RFC] ThorFOX, a FOX tokenomics upgrade proposal - #9 by 0xean
The idea of adding on the potential secondary vote on starting parameters (if we are to do that, still tbd) was an idea generated from feedback from all sides of this debate as a way to separate the contention over the param settings from the tokenomics upgrade model itself. I think that makes sense and is a reasonable way to handle a detail where there is not likely to be wide community consensus, but if this is seen as somehow meaning its not defined enough, we don’t have to do that secondary vote at all, but it seems to do the job of separating those contentions well (and seemingly has support from both those who want lower and higher params).
Right now ideation is the first actual step of the DAO governance process, so this proposal in its current form seems like its in the right place for the discussion that is now happening. If the community wants to require some additional thresholds for a proposal to be put forward into ideation then the DAO should probably consider changing its governance process again to require some preliminary steps or hurdles, but right now this seems like exactly the right time and place to have the discussion that this ideation post has elicited.
Well, it doesn’t seem like the 28 days being proposed is unclear, but perhaps you think there is a better way to approach setting this number? 28 days is generally on the long side for unstaking periods, but not unheard of, I think its a reasonable place to put this to start that does a good job of balancing any “lock” or “attack” risk without being so overly punishing as to disincentivize staking entirely.
IMO going the parametric direction would be a bit overly complex and I am trying to keep any additional complexity out of the proposal unless absolutely necessary. I don’t think getting this detail perfect right now is particularly necessary (it can be iterated on in the future, and even be a setting in any staking contract the DAO could update as needed), but if others think it is necessary to have a different model then I would encourage them to propose alternatives to what the staking may look like as you have done, there is still plenty of time in this current ideation period to have more detailed discussion on this subject for anyone who has thoughts on this.
There has been a lot of talk on this (as noted in the beginning of this post), its a reasonable concern and I don’t expect it to stop, but also am not going to continue to repeat that I disagree on the potential runway impact and why as I don’t think I am adding anything additional at this point that hasn’t already been said multiple times by myself and others. I really believe that this proposal will help the treasury and runway situation and hopefully help alleviate some of that existential contributor stress you describe or I would never have proposed it. For those who disagree, and think this is a substantial threat to the DAO and it’s treasury they should absolutely vote it down.
I really do appreciate all the feedback from you and everyone else, it has made this a much more productive and engaging discussion and I think any subsequent proposal that may go forward will be the better for it.
I don’t personally think having this in its current form in ideation is “impulsive or naive” though, and if others agree with that they should vote it down for that reason too (or better yet propose a “less impulsive and less naive” counter proposal!). And at that point the community should reconsider having ideation be the first actual step of the governance process if this current proposal doesn’t meet some misunderstood standard the DAO wishes to place on future proposals that wish to begin ideation.
my brothers in christ this echo-chamber of centralized shapeshift employees is hilarious, where’s this DAO you speak of?
I’ve chimed in multiple times in the governance and other calls, and have been a large opponent of this revamp for a variety of reasons, most of which are reiterated and discussed by Jon in the post yesterday–Great work.
I think, ultimately, it comes down to: Will this generate additional activity and revenue for the DAO? Above and beyond where it currently is? Will this happen in a sideways market? Or only in volatile settings? What kind of FOX and RUNE price action can negatively affect the KPI/deliverables, and what kind of FOX and RUNE price action will be desirable? What’s the worst case scenario with this?
Best-case scenario is: we generate interest in FOX and Shapeshift, and drive people to accumulate FOX and use app.shapeshift.com. This interest generates revenue (in the form of fees that we can dynamically lever on all app actions now) that is above and beyond the initial cost. But, how much above and beyond? 1.5x? 10x? 20x? What is the goal here? We need 142k a month to be sustainable. Is that the goal? To have this–eventually–generating all or most of our usdc payouts? How much activity will be necessary (given the current fee structure) to generate that amount of revenue (if that is the goal)? Is that within the realm of reason? How long will it take for us to (reasonably) get there?
These are the questions that I’m chewing on. I’m not so concerned with the burn aspect anymore. It doesn’t make sense to me but there’s something to gimmicks–people like and buy things because they’re gimmicky. So, there’s a marketing aspect to that that I want to be sensitive to and give credit to–a new graphic (a burn meter) is neat to see as a user, and (some) tokenomics-heads will see burning as a step in the right direction–even though I disagree and think that burning a fixed-supply token is stupid and burning should be integrated into intial tokenomics schema and not integrated in the 10th hour, but that’s just my 2 fox.
The percentage still seems a little high to me–but I also understand that without a significant reward people won’t participate.
My knee-jerk reaction is to cap it or limit it or tie it to activity in some explicit way, but having rewards lag activity could stymie the whole flywheel process and cauterize before it catalyzes.
I’ll keep posting my thoughts and start doing some explicit modeling, but I am interested in what people think as to ballpark answers to my questions above. What is the goal here? How fast can we get there? What is the worst-case scenario? When will we know we’re in that, and what do we want to plan to do before we precipitate the maxed-out worst case scenario–what are our premeditated interventionary steps to mitigate the worst-case scenario from being the worst it can be?
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Just me thinking… but to me not saying this is the only item we have a focus on. other things being built up , maybe with looing to add this similar setup on it too depending on how well it does ofc.
Def on the no burn side. just not sure what to do after that. 25% for reward, 25% for …Lockup/stream/whatever and the rest anything we want. idk if they are right or not. i 'll believe you when you say the lower might not do as well.
So, i need some clarity. We are staking FOX into a system? what is the fox going to be ‘doing’ there.
(can the DAO use that staked fox, to put into the rune/fox LP postion?)
im reskimming , and couldnt quickly find it.
Thanks for the callout GK, this is a good question and an area where this can be made clearer for any final proposal if this one ends up passing the ideation phase.
Specifically the current proposal only stipulates that in order to receive FOX benefits (including the additional ones contemplated by the proposal) that users will have to stake with an unlock period of 28 days. It leaves further implementation details up to the product and engineering workstreams, but the intention of the proposal is for this to set up a simplified staking mechanism where single sided FOX is locked into the staking contract, and it is not meant to setup any sort of system where that FOX is then available for use by the DAO for other purposes.
I think there are many places where this proposal could set the foundation for stronger FOX tokenomics iterations, including different ways to optimize and utilize the staking mechanism for the DAO’s benefit (which could also maybe even be part of a governance upgrade if the DAO ever moved to some form of veTokenomics for example), so there would be nothing inherently wrong with a subsequent governance proposal to utilize the FOX in this staking contract in some DAO agreed manner, but I think that should probably be a proposal and discussion all its own rather than as part of this foundational proposal where I think it is best to keep things simple where at all possible.
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hm. maybe a generic, the DAO is able to utilize the staked tokens.
something vague.
sure, the dao has enough tokens already, but im thinking foundational level.
we drop this on other setups, for those tokens, we can then put them in a specific use. (like eth/rune pool etc) just random thoughts.
if we started doing various single sided staking setups, attracting other token deposits, we could then setup …well, thats too forward yet.
Just want to post a follow-up and quick update since ideation voting ending over the weekend.
The proposal did pass ideation, getting the go-ahead from the community to move forward toward the formal voting stage, with seemingly strong support (aprox 89% combined yes/yes with changes) from the community that this tokenomics upgrade proposal should at least see the next stage of governance.
Great to see such a turnout with such a large amount of FOX and voters weighing in at this point, and I want to thank everyone who voted on this whether they voted it forward to the next stage or not.
I am traveling much of this week, so next part of the process will be a little bit delayed, during that time I am going to synthesize the excellent feedback from this discussion into a new draft that incorporates some of the extra clarity and ideas that have been talked about during this RFC and ideation process.
I will prob post that for a few days in this ideation thread next week as an extra informal chance for the community to weigh in with feedback for a few days before this goes up to governance for a final vote.
Most likely the next proposal will go up with the starting params removed with a contingency that if the proposal passes governance it will trigger another immediate vote on starting param settings, right now I am considering 3 potential options to put in that section based on the conversation over these params the last few months:
- 25% of RUNE to staking yield, 25% used for buyback and burn, 50% held by the treasury
- 25% of RUNE to staking yield, 0% for buyback and burn, 75% held by the treasury
- 10% of RUNE to staking yield, 10% for buyback and burn, 80% held by the treasury
This is what I am thinking for those starting param options, but would love to hear community feedback on if these should be adjusted more or potentially a 4th option added (I don’t think we should go above 4 options for this initial starting param vote and I think three is better if it hits most of the right points).
Also, if you haven’t weighed in yet and still want to add further comments to this thread, please still do so! Even though the ideation period is over i’ll still be looking for additional feedback and weighing options for this next draft until it is posted sometime next week.
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10% of RUNE to staking yield, 0% for buyback and burn, 90% held by the treasury
10% of RUNE to staking yield, 10% for buyback and Lock(method), 80% held by the treasury
or …
Sharing here a draft of what will go up for final vote for any last minute comments or thoughts.
The plan will be to post this to snapshot for 7 days voting time within the next 48 hours, if it passes the contingency vote on the initial param settings will go live within 24 hours of this proposal passing.
Considering the strong support for the prior version of the proposal by FOX voters during ideation, much of the text of this final draft remains the same.
There are at least 2 areas to highlight changes though:
- The most significant change is the contingency to vote on param settings as an additional vote if this proposal passes, that is delineated in the specification under (7) including the 3 options voters will have for starting parameters
- The other change, more minor, is adding clarification around the limit of what this single sided staking mechanism is intended to do via this proposal.
Here is the draft, please let me know thoughts/comments soon before it is posted to snapshot mid-week:
SCP-166 ThorFOX, a FOX tokenomics upgrade proposal
Summary
The goal of this proposal is to enact an upgrade to FOX tokenomics that more closely aligns the DAO with the THORChain ecosystem of which it is a vibrant part.
As part of its operations the DAO treasury receives and holds RUNE. This proposal would upgrade FOX tokenomics by paying a portion of the RUNE the DAO receives on a regular basis as “real yield” to FOX stakers in RUNE, as well as using a portion of that RUNE to buy and burn FOX.
Abstract
The ShapeShift DAO has been building through the bear market, consistently improving the interface/product offering as well as adding a number of THORChain related features in particular (such as streaming swaps, Metamask Snaps, and soon lending). Most of the focus during that time has been on improving the product and attempting to acquire users (as it should be), however the tokenomics of the DAO have not gotten nearly as much attention. This started to change slightly with SCP-153 when the community approved using FOX as a way to get discounted fees when trading. This proposal suggests, on the back of SCP-153, that the DAO should further embrace its alignment with the THORChain community by upgrading FOX tokenomics to enshrine that alignment with RUNE and the THORChain ecosystem at large.
Motivation
ShapeShift was and is one of the earliest THORChain supporters, well before others in the ecosystem recognized its value and even before the DAO launched, ShapeShift integrated THORChain for crosschain swaps. ShapeShift has consistently supported THORChain features as they are made available and most of ShapeShift DAO’s trading volume comes from users utilizing THORChain. The main motivation here is to encourage the ShapeShift community to further embrace and strategically focus on the THORChain ecosystem as its best opportunity. One of the best ways to do that is through an upgrade to FOX tokenomics that further aligns the ShapeShift DAO and THORChain communities together.
Specification
If passed, this proposal would dictate the following:
- X% of all new RUNE accumulated by the DAO treasury (from whatever source, whether donation, fees, or any other revenue stream) is paid out to FOX stakers as real yield every week (pro-rata across those who are staking). The definition of ”New” here means any revenue source that adds additional RUNE to the DAO’s treasury that wasn’t previously in the treasury prior to this proposal passing.
- X% of all new RUNE accumulated by the DAO treasury (again from whatever source, whether donation, fees, or any other revenue stream) is used to buy FOX from the open market which is then burned by being sent to 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
- The remaining X% of RUNE would continue to be held and used by the DAO treasury as governance sees fit.
- In order to effectuate this new change, it will become required that in order to get FOX benefits (such as discounts on fees, rewards, and any other benefits), a user must stake their FOX in a staking contract (this staking contract can either be the current FOXy contract or a new staking contract as determined by the Product and Engineering workstreams) as well as sign a message or transaction to assign the RUNE address where their yield will be paid. It should become standard that “unstaking” FOX takes a minimum of 28 days henceforth (though the receipt asset, such as FOXy or otherwise could still be liquid and transferable). To be clear this proposal passing would setup a simple single sided FOX staking mechanism for this purpose, it does not allow the DAO to use the staked FOX for other purposes, though future governance proposals may alter or evolve this to do so.
- New software will need to be prioritized and built by the Product and Engineering workstreams in order to allow a user to sign a message or transaction and assign a RUNE address where their yield will be paid. The user will also need the ability to update/edit this address at future dates by signing a new transaction.
- The DAO multisig will effectuate these RUNE and FOX transactions on a weekly basis based on the RUNE revenue numbers from the prior week.
- If this proposal passes, indicating the community has passed the overall tokenomics upgrade model, it will trigger an additional and immediate 7 day long snapshot vote where the community can vote on 1 of 3 options for the starting parameters (which will set the X%’s above). Those three options will be (a) 25% of RUNE to staking yield, 25% used for buyback and burn, 50% held by the treasury, (b) 25% of RUNE to staking yield, 0% for buyback and burn, 75% held by the treasury, and (c ) 10% of RUNE to staking yield, 10% for buyback and burn, 80% held by the treasury.
If this starts to see increasing success and scale (in terms of overall RUNE volume, users staking, and number of transactions needing to be made by the multi-sig on a weekly basis) then it will make sense for engineering to create a bot for use by the multi-sig to make these transactions automated and more efficient (e.g. a hot wallet which the mutli-sig fills up every week that does the transactions automatically). This is not necessary to get it going, but would become a necessary upgrade once any sort of scale increase is needed. Ultimately this proposal leaves this implementation detail and timing up to the discretion of the product and engineering workstreams unless superceded by a subsequent governance proposal.
Effectively the specification of this governance proposal would setup 3 parameters that governance could affect going forward: (1) % of RUNE accumulated that powers FOX staking yield, (2) % of RUNE accumulated used to buyback FOX from the market which is then burned and, (3) % of RUNE accumulated that is held by the treasury. While this proposal passing would set the initial starting parameters for all three of these (via the contingent subsequent snapshot vote), governance can modify this with a subsequent proposal in the future to alter any of these, including setting any of them between 0-100%.
Benefits
The major benefit to this proposal is upgrading FOX tokenomics in a sustainable way that more closely aligns the ShapeShift DAO with the THORChain ecosystem. With this alignment, the better RUNE and THORChain does, the better the ShapeShift DAO does as well. This creates ongoing yield opportunity for FOX stakers to earn RUNE (something which does not exist in many fashions outside of running a RUNE node or LPing on THORChain) and it starts to consistently burn FOX on a regular basis, all in a sustainable manner.
Another potential benefit to this proposal is that it could establish the foundation for a further upgrade to veTokenomics in regards to governance and for voting on how and where revenue the DAO earns is used on a more active basis. That is better served for a future proposal due to further complexity, but this proposal passing would setup such a natural evolution for subsequent tokenomic upgrades being successful.
Drawbacks
The major drawbacks of this proposal are the time and priority of the product and engineering workstreams in order to make these changes and operate the system on an ongoing basis.
It also could create some additional ongoing burden and workload for the Operations workstream who would have to field and respond to user questions and issues around this tokenomics upgrade and its effects.
There are opportunity costs to aligning with the THORChain ecosystem further, such as not aligning further with other ecosystems the DAO may wish to pursue or other engineering and product features which do not get prioritized as a result.
Finally the obvious drawback of aligning the DAO further with the THORChain ecosystem could have negative effects for FOX whenever RUNE is in a downtrend (such as in a bear market).
Vote
Voting “For” this proposal would enact the tokenomics changes for FOX as stipulated in the specification of this proposal. The initial parameters will be set via a contingent secondary vote if this proposal passes as described in (7) of the specification section. A “for” vote also serves to prioritize the product and engineering work streams to enact this proposal as quickly as reasonably possible.
Voting “Against” this proposal would enact no changes.
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No option for the buyback and Hold fox option? (sablier stream etc?) especially at this first run at this? we could later after … 6months see if this is good or not, then decide to burn that fox (or hedgey’s every week set for 18months (or whatever) and later on, decide to burn them. or not burn them.
i kinda lost the thought when i didnt see the option of buy fox and hold… ill have to reread.
That option didn’t seem as fleshed out (as we don’t know what the hold/lock/stream would look like yet), so I figured the 0% burn could cover it for now for those like yourself who don’t want to see a burn and then a subsequent proposal could modify the burn option to be buy/lock or something like that?
Would you prefer to see an actual 4th option for starting parameters that is buy and lock @Giantkin ? I’m just not exactly sure how to word/define that one but I’m up for suggestions.
i would, equal to the rune to stake i think. x% buy fox (and leave that to tbd what to do with it?)
i like the hedgey option, but if the sablier stream back to the DAO might not show, that would be cool to.
hm.
so 4 Buy x% RUNE to staking yield, x% for buyback and hold, Treasury= remaining %
Params on the HOLD tbd. (pure, hedgey, Sablier(other?)
Sorry. pita i am 
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Okay would you prefer it just replaces #3 then since that option was mainly there to give a “no burn” option, not sure if we need 2 such options? (and it might be better to not overwhelm with too many options for that vote.)
So the option would be 25% to fox staking yield, 25% to treasury locked fox and 50% held by the treasury.
That sound good @Giantkin?
I like it! and yes, 3 is fine. (course, if i get yelled at…i guess i could capitulate back to 0) lol
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We launched lending in November
FOXy will not work for implementation. Please remove so people don’t get confused and yeet funds into this like so.
I’d recommend scoping this to just the staking use case. Moving into “you only get discounts by staking” would require amending SCP 153 and SCP 163 to capture all the features. At first read that seemed like it needed a bit more time to breathe. However, very much aligning with getting platform benefits only comes from skin in the game.
Overall, I think a ranked choice vote is a good approach and hope we get as much engagement as in ideation. 
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