[RFC] SCP 157: Grant authority to update DAO ENS Records to Product and Engineering Workstream Leaders


Currently the DAO has no process by which to update ENS records for its ENS name (shapeshiftdao.eth) other than through governance. This proposal would delegate the authority to update records associated with our ENS name to the leaders of the Product and Engineering workstreams. Authority to modify the primary addresses for any blockchain would specifically not be included in this proposal.


The DAO’s ENS records must be updated by on-chain transactions originating from the Shapeshift DAO’s multisignature wallet. This proposal would allow the DAO’s signers to modify ENS records, with the exception of primary addresses, at the request of either the Product or Engineering workstream leader. This will allow for us to utilize these records to the benefit of the Shapeshift application and the DAO without requiring a governance approval for each modification.


The ShapeShift application has been re-deployed to fleek’s new platform (fleek.xyz). This deployment, currently available at fleek.shapeshift.com, offers a more decentralized alternative to our CloudFlare hosted app (app.shapeshift.com). The content hash records associated with our ENS domain are currently serving a version of the application that was released in January of 2023 and should be updated. Recently introduced changes into our build pipeline will ensure that the fleek deployment will always mirror the current version of the primary application. By delegating the authority to update our ENS records to these workstream leaders we can update the content hash record so our fleek deployment will be available from our ENS domain and any future required updates will be much simpler and not require a proposal.


The Product or Engineering workstream leader will be delegated the authority to request updates to any ENS records, with the exception of the primary blockchain addresses. These requests will be facilitated by the DAO’s multisig signers. As a check and balance on this authority, if the multisig signers believe the update to be malicious they are not compelled to execute the transaction and may reject the request forcing the update to then proceed through governance.

Additionally, this proposal will utilize the oSnap Module to provide the first update to our content hash. This is mainly meant to be a low risk test of the yet to be used oSnap Module. This transaction will be included only in the final snapshot vote since the oSnap Module doesn’t understand our Ideation process.

Contract Interaction
to: 0x4976fb03C32e5B8cfe2b6cCB31c09Ba78EBaBa41
function: multicall()
data (bytes): 0x304e6ade8cecb61cd3c3e4925c76e05bd3cb407ae010e3c3ae528617c499346790b50b230000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000040000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002ae501017200240801122074a0e0d9ce0aa9e7227fd7ae081d296021ea53863b8c3f6e43f2459f65868ce400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 

This transaction will update shapeshiftdao.eth’s ENS content hash records from ipns://k51qzi5uqu5dm8qlm1yk060voo84cm369avf7d8ky4y7o66ujajygnvqkhkudd
Here is a tenderly link to help validate the transaction


  1. Delegates authority to trusted workstream leaders to modify records as needed.
  2. Allows for badly needed updates to occur to our content hash so that a more decentralized option is available to users of the application
  3. Creates a mechanism for checks and balances of this new power
  4. In an emergency situation this provides a path to a much quicker resolution than the governance process.


  1. Workstream leaders could theoretically update these records to the detriment of the DAO.

moved to ideation - https://forum.shapeshift.com/thread/ideation-scp-157-grant-authority-to-update-dao-ens-records-to-product-and-engineering-workstream-leaders-47284