SCP-154: Not Ready for Prime Time

(This letter has also been uploaded to IPFS: https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmT8Fc9PvBcv4nS3pGZ2S9Z5zk84CHSVZvDdo9yBAtcrTY)

Hello ShapeShift DAO community -

The purpose of this joint statement is to urge FOX holders to vote against SCP-154, the governance proposal that is currently being offered as an alternative to SCP-153 (a parametric fee proposal accompanied by tokenomics incentives).

This statement is issued by the following actors in the ShapeShift DAO ecosystem:

Ops Workstream Leader

Product Workstream Leader

Engineering Workstream Leader

Tokenomics Workstream Leader

Head of Technology (Fox Foundation)

SCP-154 would mandate that the DAO pursue an experiment with FOX Rewards. We’re adamantly opposed to such a path as specified in the proposal, due to our belief that it will:

  • Require the DAO to build a spec that lacks any currently-viable platform

  • Hitch the DAO's fortunes to a rewards platform that–in the eyes of the technical experts of this group–is not ready for production
  • Expose a material amount of the DAO's FOX to heightened smart contract risk
  • Builds upon a spec that is not complete and, at current, has zero support amongst the Workstream Leaders who would be implementing it
  • Implements a Tokenomics model that is untenable given the DAO's current circumstances
  • Overturns the community's judgment voiced in the governance-approved Product Roadmap
  • Wastes the DAO's limited time and resources on an idea that is unlikely to lead to sustainable increases in volume or user retention
  • Likely to result in large-volume traders (who would benefit most from such an arrangement) quickly dumping their rewarded FOX
  • Undermine workstream leader autonomy and create the risk of endless governance quagmires

Note that the intent of this statement is not to create an Appeal to Authority; we are only five Foxes amongst hundreds of enthusiastic community members. However, we believe our deep familiarity with the DAO (a natural consequence of our roles), as well as expertise within our given fields, puts us in an excellent position to evaluate FOX Rewards.

We hold a variety of opinions and often disagree on other matters–but on this matter we speak clearly and as one voice:

FOX Rewards as specified in SCP-154 is untenable, risky, and built on a rickety foundation of flawed assumptions and incomplete work. To implement it now would be a potentially grave strategic blunder at a time when the DAO can ill afford such mistakes.

Lessons learned…or not?

The DAO recently conducted another experiment with rewards using a platform called Thrivecoin. This experiment was objectively a failure (even according to most of those who directly worked on it) and resulted in a narrowly-averted reduction of the community’s stablecoin treasury; it did not lead to a sustained increase in volume or users, and it cost the DAO precious time managing it.

Most worryingly, rushing into the experiment without thinking through all elements of the implementation (including edge cases and failure modes) resulted in the DAO nearly losing over $50,000 in OP tokens, which would have required treasury intervention. It was only through the last-minute intervention of a third party that this scenario was narrowly avoided. This is unacceptable as an operating practice.

Additionally, the partner selected for a prototype is not a production-grade battle-tested platform/team. In our previous engagement with them this summer we found their technical knowledge to be intermediate at best. Despite being passionate and helpful, they lack the critical savvy for adjusting to the needs of such a complex program. Accordingly, the likelihood that something goes wrong is too high to support the program and its related FOX budget.

Luck is not a strategy.

Experimentation is precisely what the DAO needs right now, and it’s okay for experiments to fail. What is not okay, in our view, is failing to learn the lessons gleaned from Thrivecoin & Foxatars. The results of that trial call for a more careful, considered, conservative, and cautious approach with any rewards program–especially one that directly involves the DAO’s native token. Yet SCP-154 proposes that we do the exact opposite by pushing the DAO to move forward with FOX Rewards.

The undersigned community members have repeatedly expressed concerns about FOX Rewards over the past several months–(and in some cases, even since the concept was first floated)–long before the current fee debate reared its head. These concerns were only magnified by the Thrivecoin results, as well as the latest implementation details spelled out in the new Fox Rewards Proposal. But rather than embrace these lessons and concerns, SCP-154 proposes that the DAO rush headlong in a strategic maneuver that reveals deep flaws when subjective to the light of scrutiny.

Our specific concerns with SCP-154 are as follows:

There is currently no suitable platform on which to build FOX Rewards

To date we are unaware of any platform that fits the needed specification that is production ready. Mercle has been suggested as a possible option, but as of writing is not audited, lacks sufficient documentation and has raised major concerns with our engineering team over past interactions.

The community asking for this to be prioritized without additional scoping and technical design work is similar to writing a blank check. At this time we simply don’t know how much this effort will cost in terms of engineering resources–and even if we did, there is no suitable platform on which to build the spec.

Our first engagement with the proposed rewards platform was not promising

The draft spec referred to by SCP-154 outlines Mercle as the FOX Rewards platform. During an initial (unrelated) engagement with Mercle, the DAO required a full-time engineer working through the weekend to diagnose problems with their codebase, downloading their app, and fixing their codebase. Given this experience, we believe there’s a higher likelihood that there would be bugs in the platform as proposed in SCP-154.

The Mercle team seem to be eager to build useful products in the web3 space and we wish them the best in their efforts. We also appreciate them taking the time to engage with the community. They appear to be good-faith actors and are working on improving their platform. However, given our recent experience (as well as the deep technical concerns outlined in the following section), we believe the platform to be an unviable path forward as described in SCP-154.

SCP-154’s technical specification (as articulated in the draft spec referred to in the proposal) is untested and not ready for production

The technical/engineering/developer experts amongst us (namely 0xean and 0xdef1cafe) have evaluated the Mercle platform that would be used in FOX Rewards and have come to the following conclusions.

After conducting initial due diligence, 0xean believes that Mercle is not production ready. He has identified several critical requirements that should be in place before Mercle is considered further including:

A professional audit, with all high and medium severity issues mitigated.

Documentation provided to the engineering workstream on how the signing server is currently secured and who has access.

Implementation of additional fail safe mechanisms beyond token approvals that limit the impacts of unexpected behavior. These should be built into Mercle’s signing server and include at a minimum: limits on total FOX emitted, FOX emitted per time period, and maximum FOX emitted per address.

0xdeficafe has the following concerns:

Mercle is a relatively less-experienced development agency; their social proof and testimonials are largely from the previous project they worked on with us https://mercle.xyz/. As previously discussed, the Engineering Workstream used an inordinate amount of resources assisting with delivery of the Foxatars project–and as such, would not recommend working with them again.

The positioning of Mercle as a comparable alternative to an existing experienced and responsible team across the entire engineering lifecycle, as is required for a program such as FOX Rewards, is misleading.

Mercle’s own representation of themselves is illustrative of their capabilities https://mercle-1.gitbook.io/mercle-public/team

It’s predicated on flawed assumptions about the inherent business model

FOX Rewards in and of themselves may someday be an effective way to drive more users and volume to the platform. However, this would be predicated on the DAO already earning a meaningful amount of revenue–something that is not currently true.

The DAO’s list of affiliate partnerships looks impressive, but in fact most of these affiliate streams are moribund and/or effectively dead. For instance, as shown by the revenue dashboard, the vast majority of those partnerships generated nothing for the DAO from May-July. (The failure of the affiliate revenue approach and the lack of a sustainable business model is why many at the DAO are calling for a pivot away from this failed approach, toward one that combines well-articulated tokenomics with a fee model.)

Optional donations, which have been tested for several months, have proven to be an unreliable and de-minimus revenue source. The DAO’s only reliable source of revenue is the Cosmos validator, which itself is highly exposed to the price of ATOM (which is trading near long-term lows). Yet this proposal presupposes these inert seeds will magically blossom once they’re nourished by FOX sprinkled from the heavens.

What the DAO needs now is to experiment with new sources of revenue–not likely-doomed efforts to transform inert seeds into green shoots.

SCP-154 does not make sense from a tokenomics perspective

Since the inception of FOX Rewards as an idea, various community members have voiced concerns that a large amount of newly-acquired FOX would be quickly dumped on the market. SCP-154 proposes that in order to avoid this dynamic, the DAO could simply purchase FOX using the revenue it generated via the Rewards program. Yet if this were the case, the DAO would not actually stand to earn anything from the rewards program.

It’s been proposed that alternatively, the DAO could keep the revenue it earned. In that case, the community concerns about token-dumping would not be addressed.

A “worst of both worlds” approach, whereby some percentage of revenue is kept and the rest is spent on FOX buybacks, has also been put forth. This would continue to expose the DAO to some degree of token dumping, while undermining the ability of the rewards program to generate revenue. Even if one generously assumes the right balance between revenue and buybacks could be dialed in, this would likely be a time-consuming endeavor, complicated by the vagaries of both users and the market. The DAO does not have the luxury of time.

This program might be viable in a scenario where the DAO is already earning enough revenue to offset expenses. (In fact, this is one of the blockers that the Product team identified, as outlined below).

From a risk standpoint, the FOX Rewards proposal specifies that 10 million FOX would be budgeted for the program, with up to 2M in a new Safe. This amounts to $200,000 and $40,000 at current prices, respectively. Given the aforementioned analysis of how no feasible and safe platform currently exists, it would be folly to risk any amount of FOX in these efforts.

Lastly, SCP-154 does not have a compelling value accrual mechanism for FOX. This stands in contrast to SCP-153, which does create new reasons to hold FOX due to its incentivization structure.

SCP-154 raises a host of product concerns

The spec isn’t done, full stop. It’s premature to discuss a proposal unless there’s clarity about implementation and potential solutions to perceived challenges. On top of that, the inconsistencies across the proposed spec are jarring and confusing:

There’s a proposed cost for Foxatars which is similar to charging a fee.

There is a list of several blockers with no resolution path. (To be clear, some initial blockers/concerns have been addressed. This is promising, but in the opinion of the Product Workstream much more work needs to be done before the spec is ready for governance.)

The economics don’t make sense and are naive about growth projections. FOX rewards will not lead to 10% MOM growth continuously in a bear market. Yet, that’s implied.

The technical due diligence is not complete, and it was suggested that the team that built the platform does their own diligence.

Now that API’s charge us for volume we make even less; passing back revenues to users means we have a deficit.

Myriad operational concerns

FOX rewards and the public good/grants programs at the DAO have cost constant monthly cycles in salary from contributors in Marketing, Global, Moderation, Product, Operations, and sometimes even Engineering (a much higher $/hour spend and distraction of our most valuable resource) that have never been fully measured and accounted for under the current public good focused strategy as an additional cost incurred.

A premature rewards program, or commitment to continue down the path of free plus optional donations without a stable source of revenue will only further the austerity measures enacted by this DAO. As we continue to lose resources and trim our monthly costs, a lack of revenue generating strategies will eventually lead to a lack in development output, quality, and future potential products and services of the DAO.

With the development of the API, it has become clear that there is a winning strategy in providing services outside of the app to consumers willing to pay for good services. We have a clear model for success and iteration through building out the API and future offerings like SDKs and widgets of our services. Providing the service(s) to be consumed and built on seamlessly so that ShapeShift is once again the preferred backbone and utilized service provider for a plethora of crypto platforms and services is 10-100x the bet on exponential user growth/ShapeShift service consumption. We just found out we are good at making engines, and the timeline to manufacture and sell them as working cars in addition to them as engines is at our disposal if we resource and focus properly.

Our services have a better shot of being able to be more relied upon and functional with a ShapeShift future that includes a monetized service that consumers are willing to pay for. We have begun to scratch the surface of that with our API work. Our app can always reflect our services as a demo version of what our API (and future services) can be built into, but no longer needs to be burdened with the weight of being the sole breadwinner if we can continue to iterate on services people are willing to pay for. Many crypto companies right now surviving the bear are here because they provide a service users are willing to pay for.

SCP-153 starts the conversation for the rails for monetization and empowers the DAO to build where the utility is. SCP-154 dictates a Product roadmap guideline and creates more gray area and lack of clarity in the community’s wishes with regards to direct authority in SCP-92 and SCP-149.

If we are to continue in a direction where SCP-154 passes, there is little hope for the monetization of this utility as resources are poured (again) into a scope of a program that clearly needs more research and time before enacting.

If we can provide a service that makes clear revenue based on utility, rewards programs will have a foundation to succeed from. Monetization will need to come first, and rewards programs are not mutually exclusive to public good services. These potential user growth tokenomic focused programs via rewards should be given the proper foundation and growth potential of funding, and can and should be revisited after we establish more revenue positive services.

The FOX Rewards proposal upends decisions previously made by both the community and Workstream Leaders

SCP-154 stipulates that even though the Product Workstream will have the ability to prioritize FOX Rewards, “…all Workstreams will be expected to do everything in their power (within reason) to launch the FOX Rewards experiment within a reasonable time frame.” This ambiguously-worded mandate is tantamount to forced prioritization and is untenable as an operating strategy, for it would force the undersigned Workstream Leaders to engage in a good-faith effort to launch an experiment we believe to be risky, flawed, and poorly-conceived.

This quasi-prioritization also undermines the recent (and overwhelmingly-approved) community approval of a Product Roadmap that clearly and unambiguously prioritized the API and put far less focus on shiny interface features without success/failure criteria. FOX Rewards, meanwhile, were listed as only one of several potential “bets” for the DAO. Upon taking a closer look at this Roadmap item, Product identified a number of blockers as described above. SCP-154 seeks to overturn this sound judgment by forcing Product (and other Workstreams) to do “everything in their power” to launch FOX Rewards. This is arguably an abuse of FOX holders bandwidth and Workstream Leader roles/responsibilities.

The community has already spoken with respect to prioritization. While it ultimately has the last word on everything the DAO does, forcing a change of priorities in order to avoid fees being added to the platform sets an undesirable precedent that could result in confusion and muddle the DAO’s efforts to gain a clear sense of strategic direction.

Not ready for Prime Time

Even if one discounts the tokenomics, business model, product, operational, and forced-prioritization concerns outlined above, the technical and smart contract risks warrant stringent opposition to SCP-154.

To reiterate: there is currently no suitable platform we’re aware on which to build FOX Rewards. Passing a proposal in the face of that fact amounts to a blank check that would likely lead to confusion, ambiguity, and the waste of DAO resources.

With respect to Mercle, proffered in the draft spec mentioned in SCP-154 as a suitable platform, is in fact highly untested and riskly. The DAO is not in a position to be experimenting with platforms that are so untested, particularly when there’s a substantial opportunity cost engaging with said platforms instead of more promising routes. Especially when we know that the proposed implementations’ technical expertise is lacking; they’re a brand new platform without any other distributions under their belt, and the modeling remains inaccurate.

The FOX Rewards proposal appears to be a hasty effort to offer an alternative to fee experiments, similar to how optional donations were hastily conceived in order to avoid fee experiments earlier this year. The undersigned are uniformly in favor of the fee experiment articulated by SCP-153 and believe its implementation is the best thing the DAO can do, at the current juncture, to improve its odds of long-term success.

As such, we strongly advocate voting for SCP-153, and against SCP-154. For community members strongly opposed to fees, a simple “NO” on both proposals would suffice to oppose both the fee experiment and the proposed FOX Rewards (and all the risks and pitfalls it entails).

FOX Rewards as articulated by SCP-154 is simply not ready for Prime Time. The overall concept of FOX Rewards is an idea whose time may someday come. That day, in our collective opinion as community members who care deeply about the DAO and its long-term success, is not now.

Thank you for your attention and consideration around this important governance matter,

Kent - Tokenomics Workstream Leader

Tyler - Ops Workstream Leader

FBL - Product Workstream Leader

0xdef1cafe - Engineering Workstream Leader

0xean - Head of Technology (Fox Foundation)

In hindsight, perhaps it would have been best to leave FOX Rewards out of this debate and focus on fees vs. no fees, as I think the arguments against enabling fees at this time are strong enough on their own.

When SCP-153 was created, I felt it was necessary to make a counter proposal clearly outlining the arguments against it. I also thought it made sense to include FOX Rewards in the counter proposal to make it clear that if fees are enabled, the community would forfeit the opportunity to experiment with No Fees + FOX rewards, while also getting a clear signal on whether the community would prefer to finally put this vision to the test.

You’re right that the proposal and spec were put together hastily, and for this I apologize. I really believe that enabling fees is not in the best interest of the DAO and that No Fees + FOX Rewards has the best potential to attract what it actually needs (users and volume) and felt compelled to make the counter proposal before the Fee proposal went up for final vote.

I did purposefully leave FOX Rewards prioritization as well as implementation open-ended so that if SCP-154 passes, it doesn’t require that product nor engineering launch it nor even start working on it immediately. Passing SCP-154 would simply give a clear signal from the community that they would like to experiment with FOX Rewards, while also approving the budget and establishing the Rewards Committee so we can be prepared in the event that product and engineering do prioritize and implement the experiment.

I appreciate and respect each of the workstream leaders that signed off on this letter. However, I strongly disagree with the arguments that are made and believe you’re making a serious mistake by not considering the arguments against fees and for No Fees + FOX Rewards with an open mind. This is why I felt compelled to make the case directly to the community.

Enabling fees will not bring in meaningful revenues at current volumes. The majority of trade volume is already donating at the 30bps flat rate, and enabling mandatory fees will destroy near-term grant opportunities that are an order of magnitude greater than what mandatory fees will generate over the next 12 months at current volumes.

What the DAO needs and that the fee proposal ignores is more users and more volume. This is the only way that the DAO survives. In order to do this, the DAO needs to be the best at features that users demand. While the platform is closer than it’s ever been to this, it’s still not quite there, or if it is, target users either don’t know or don’t feel compelled to switch. No Fees & FOX Rewards is a sound and scalable model that can make ShapeShift objectively the best way to use top protocols and services from a financial perspective, and can help raise awareness and motivate target users to give ShapeShift a try. Enabling fees will not generate meaningful revenue at current volumes, but it does make it much harder to attract and retain the users and volumes that the DAO needs.

I invite anyone who is skeptical about this to read the counter proposal, review the spec, plug your own assumptions into the attached model, and/or test Mercle’s proof of concept. I hope you’ll see as I do that enabling fees right now would be a potentially fatal mistake, and that while FOX Rewards needs a bit more work before it’s ready for prime time, the model is sound and worthy of experimentation while we take advantage of the growing number of funding avenues for public goods and continue building things that users actually want.

The DAO recently conducted another experiment with rewards using a platform called Thrivecoin. This experiment was objectively a failure (even according to most of those who directly worked on it) and resulted in a narrowly-averted reduction of the community’s stablecoin treasury; it did not lead to a sustained increase in volume or users, and it cost the DAO precious time managing it.

Most worryingly, rushing into the experiment without thinking through all elements of the implementation (including edge cases and failure modes) resulted in the DAO nearly losing over $50,000 in OP tokens, which would have required treasury intervention. It was only through the last-minute intervention of a third party that this scenario was narrowly avoided. This is unacceptable as an operating practice.

The DAO never risked to owe this money, not even “nearly”. ThriveCoin’s Terms of Services (namely Section 4.2) made sure that the DAO never had such financial liability. We chose to find a better way to deal with this by disqualifying people who highly likely attempted to cheat, and we did it thanks to Gitcoin and ThriveCoin.

Since I have explained this during a Strategy call on 2023-08-23 in which all the authors of this open letters participated and to @0xFBL directly, earlier same day, during a Linner call, in text… I’m really surprised to see this “argument” resurface now and vetted by the same people.

I’m not done reading this open letter, but as this seems to be the first argument against FOX Rewards and most of the co-authors of it know it to be false, I’m actually the one who is “worried” about the honesty of the rest of the arguments I’m about to read.

EDIT:

it did not lead to a sustained increase in volume or users

As it’s in here I should address it here and not in a potential other answer.

I think this huge difference has also been explained few times by willy and by myself.

The trading volume and user count was sustained as long as rewards/incentives were present, that’s the “objective” takeaway, not “it’s all a failure because only few people stuck around”.

The point of FOX Rewards is to have a perpetual rewards program tied to/financed by actual revenue and not to a grant (with only punctual rewards) like it was the case with the “Explore Optimism” program. This huge difference has also been explained few times to the authors of this document, unfortunately when this point gets raised it usually gets ignored.

If you have actual ways to drive trading volume/users to the app, why not explain them and put them in a spec and actually experiment it. People who think financial incentives work have done this and they did drive volume to the app in the past. All the other solutions I have heard, after asking multiple times to the authors of this letter, rely basically on “new features to attract users”, and yet as we see with the recent ThorChain Streaming Swaps and even more recently MetaMask Snap, people are not flooding the app… as cool as theses features are. So what are your actual solutions?

There are a lot of arguments here, and I appreciate the leaders taking the time to summarize them in writing and make the case for what they believe is right. I’ve done my best to read this letter with an open mind, but I still can’t help but strongly believe the arguments listed in this letter are flawed, biased, and/or misleading. The more that I hear these arguments, the more conviction I have that the No Fee + FOX Rewards model, along with continuing to focus on executing the DAO’s mission and vision, is the best hope that ShapeShift has for not just surviving, but thriving.

Here’s a short response to each of the arguments listed. Happy to discuss any of these further.

  • Require the DAO to build a spec that lacks any currently-viable platform

SCP-154 does not require that the DAO build this. It simply provides a signal from the community that they would like to execute an experiment that has been a core part of the vision and roadmap since DAO genesis.

  • Hitch the DAO’s fortunes to a rewards platform that–in the eyes of the technical experts of this group–is not ready for production

The DAO’s fortunes are not hitched on the rewards platform. FOX Rewards is an experiment with the potential to solve the DAO’s greatest challenges of attracting users, volumes, and revenues. If it isn’t successful, the DAO can test other experiments to solve these core issues, including fees if that’s what the community elects (although I’d hope we could come up with better ideas than this). If it is successful, the DAO will have identified a successful, scalable, and sustainable solution that cultivates network effects and will be very difficult to replicate.

  • Expose a material amount of the DAO’s FOX to heightened smart contract risk

The FOX, capped at 2M, will be held in a gnosis safe (same contracts where it’s currently held), and only a portion of this needs to be approved for spend by Mercle’s reward contract. For example, 200,000 FOX, or ~$5,000 worth, can be approved, and as rewards are claimed by users, the approved allowance can be increased before it’s depleted. So at most, 200,000 FOX will be exposed to heightened smart contract risk. Further, Mercle has agreed to complete an audit prior to launch.

  • Builds upon a spec that is not complete and, at current, has zero support amongst the Workstream Leaders who would be implementing it

The spec could benefit from more attention, it was put together in a week, but the core components are there and demonstrate how low the lift would be to implement this experiment as well as the sizable opportunity if the experiment is successful. The fact that both the product and engineering workstream leaders do not support an experiment with such high potential and low lift, while being so adamant that fees will solve any of the DAO’s problems, makes me seriously question whether they are the right combination of leaders considering the extensive authority that has been delegated to them.

  • Implements a Tokenomics model that is untenable given the DAO’s current circumstances

SCP-154 adds significantly more utility to FOX than SCP-153, and the model is not at all untenable. It enables the DAO to maintain its public good status and eligibility for grants that are an order of magnitude greater than what fees will generate in the next 12 months. It’s inherently sustainable by only rewarding a portion of the affiliate revenues generated by users. If this % back is set between 10-50% depending on FOX holdings, rewarding $100,000 of FOX would mean the DAO has generated $200,000-$1M of revenues. The community can choose to retain all of those revenues and subsidize the rewards from FOX in the treasury, or can choose to spend $100k of the revenues generated to buy back (aka accrue value to) FOX, which would result in net buy pressure for FOX assuming <100% of the FOX rewarded will be claimed and sold.

  • Overturns the community’s judgment voiced in the governance-approved Product Roadmap

How so? The community approved the FOX Rewards pilot in the latest roadmap proposal; it’s detailed in ShapeShift’s decentralization announcement and is still on https://shapeshift.com/roadmap. Further, if SCP-154 is passed, that would clearly demonstrate that the community is in favor of the experiment. If anything, the product and engineering workstream leaders overturned the community’s judgement by deprioritizing the FOX Rewards pilot while also unilaterally enabling fees despite SCP-128’s explicit disapproval to do so.

  • Wastes the DAO’s limited time and resources on an idea that is unlikely to lead to sustainable increases in volume or user retention

This is exactly how I feel about the fee debate. The difference is that FOX Rewards actually has logical arguments for why it will lead to sustainable increases in volume and user retention.

  • Likely to result in large-volume traders (who would benefit most from such an arrangement) quickly dumping their rewarded FOX

So you agree that FOX Rewards is likely to result in large-volume traders? Assuming 100% of them do dump their rewarded FOX, that’s fine, 50% of the revenues they generate could be used to buy back the rewarded FOX, and the DAO would keep the other 50%.

  • Undermine workstream leader autonomy and create the risk of endless governance quagmires

Workstream leaders will maintain all of their autonomy. While the community has delegated authority to the product workstream to prioritize the roadmap, the community maintains the authority to either revoke or override that authority. SCP-154 simply reiterates that the community still wishes to run an experiment that has been discussed since DAO Genesis and already approved via governance.

  • There’s a proposed cost for Foxatars which is similar to charging a fee.

This is not similar to charging a fee because the fees can be easily avoided. FOX Rewards give Foxatar holders unique and uncapped value that would not be easily accessible outside of ShapeShift. Further, users will also receive an attractive and evolvable NFT that helps express their solidarity. This also directly addresses the concern that “Lastly, SCP-154 does not have a compelling value accrual mechanism for FOX. This stands in contrast to SCP-153, which does create new reasons to hold FOX due to its incentivization structure.” As stated in SCP-154, “While it’s true that this [SCP-153] would add some utility, the amount of utility is equivalent to the incremental convenience that the interface provides relative to other avenues. In other words, the utility is equivalent to the value of saving a few clicks. If this same model is instead applied to FOX Rewards, the added utility for FOX becomes equivalent to the incremental revenues the user earns by using ShapeShift (aka uncapped). By holding more FOX, users could generate additional revenues that would otherwise be inaccessible (ie. 10% for holding a FOXatar, 20% for holding a FOXatar and 10k FOX… 50% for holding a FOXatar and 1M+ FOX)”

“Mercle has been suggested as a possible option, but as of writing is not audited, lacks sufficient documentation and has raised major concerns with our engineering team over past interactions.”

With 12,000 unique Foxatar holders, this has been one of the most widely adopted features that ShapeShift DAO has ever launched, surpassed only by the trade and bridge completions driven by the Explore Optimism mission. The Mercle team has since developed an elegant and functional proof of concept on top of their existing platform for tracking both on and offchain actions, updating the Foxatar metadata to represent these activities, and enabling users to claim a proportional amount of FOX rewards relative to the revenues generated by their actions. Further, they have committed to completing an audit on the rewards contract, provided documentation on their platform, and documented the fail safe mechanism, addressing each of 0xean’s requests in a short timeframe. The picture that 0xdef1cafe has painted of Mercle as well as the work done to launch Foxatars is not an accurate representation of reality. In reality, working with Mercle to prepare for the launch of Foxatars, (not to mention the launch of Mercle), helped ShapeShift identify some serious bugs with both ShapeShift and KeepKey that had been in production for years. Their platform was already working great with other wallets like Metamask. Beyond fixing issues with ShapeShift’s WalletConnect integration and message signing, as well as the work to support NFTs, the work to integrate Foxatars was minimal. Here is what Mercle’s lead developer and the full-time engineer that worked through the weekend had to say about the interaction:

I’ve responded to a lot so will leave it here for now. Again, happy to dive deeper on any of these points and/or respond to any arguments that I missed. Thanks to all foxes that are taking the time to consider arguments on both sides.

we should discuss less this, experiment different stuff than fees for 1000 users, stop writing like lawyers and talking like doctors put or product in place cause I am taking 10 minutes to load shapeshift and make a swap

damn it my comment was so good before metaforo bugged …

I’m going to take this moment to record some impressions now that we’ve finally “decided” on what has been an issue for a long time. If we take into account a leadership consensus, respect and fraternity among leaders, Globalization would certainly have taken a position and not been forced to be thrown aside. Since this is the case, I decided not to comment while this was in voting period.

This topic has been forced since the moment it was rejected through a past proposal. Yes, leaders have enough power to lead any internal process but I think we forget that besides us there are a vast mass of token holders who are not even interested in what we are doing here or have the chance to give their opinion. This leads me to believe that we are a minority deciding for ShapeShift DAO future. Good times when 4mi was a challenging quorum huh? Lets be realistic… We know any workstream leader can approve a proposal, just put their FOX bag on the table and its done - wheres the decentralization we promised? Shouldn’t we be thinking about increasing Quorum or reforming the Governance process in line with a actual tokenomics tendency? FOX is old school and there are a plenty of other Governance/Tokenomics setups that are way more innovative. This is what we should focus our energies in my opinion.

Regarding Mercle, even though we have technical arguments for not carrying out certain raids with them, I firmly believe that Global talents are a must have for the DAO. We are stifling global talents by paying high USDC salaries to contributors and leaders who could be replaced with fair, lower compensation. They are out there, there are brilliant talents in Brazil, India, all over Europe. Even so, I still have difficulty suggesting a senior engineer who holds a leadership position at Tesla to compete for a position here, simply because the argument will be the same: we don’t trust people who are outside our circle - and the world is happening outside. We can have the engine and structure in hands, but our interface KPIs are still also questionable given that we can barely maintain stable nodes.

So we caught ourselves on the same crossroad, as usual. What are we? If we are going to fees I hope that the leaders mentioned in this proposal take responsibility for supporting and guiding other Workstreams and core contributors during this new mission instead of trying to cannibalize them.

Those are great governance questions @thesmith ; for example, maybe quorum should be tied to USD value of FOX rather than some arbitrary amount? Now feels like a good time to dig deeper into governance, since we’re currently having other discussions about that topic (like the ideation-removal and metaforo-replacement proposals drafted by 0xean.) If there are compelling alternatives to our current governance process I’d be curious to hear what those are, and what problems they solve. Same with Tokenomics - and of course you’re always welcome to present those ideas on the weekly Tokenomics call.

Regarding a few of your other points…

The purpose of the joint letter was to combine the opinions of Workstream Leaders who felt strongly about FOX Rewards being a sub-optimal idea for the DAO, rather than present a unified opinion of all Workstream Leaders. The WSL’s who weren’t included had not expressed a strong opinion in our leadership chats and other forums, or had clearly stated they were on the fence about the issue.

“Lets be realistic… We know any workstream leader can approve a proposal, just put their FOX bag on the table and its done - wheres the decentralization we promised?”

This is simply not true. With 30M, 40M, even 55M FOX getting voted on issues these days, it’s very safe to say that no single WSL has the ability to unilaterally decide any governance issue (unless the proposal has very little voting, in which case it’s a matter of apathy/inattention rather than a decentralization problem). IMO the DAO’s decentralization (from a governance standpoint) is actually doing great. This has been one of the positive aspects of the relatively low FOX price; it makes it much easier to own a meaningful amount of FOX. And sure enough we now have much broader range of accounts voting on issues.

If a WSL (or any single actor, or entity) could single-handedly decide a vote, the DAO’s governance would be fundamentally broken and I’d say we should definitely go back to the drawing board. But again, I don’t think this is even remotely the case.

“We are stifling global talents by paying high USDC salaries to contributors and leaders who could be replaced with fair, lower compensation. They are out there, there are brilliant talents in Brazil, India, all over Europe.”

This is an interesting point. How to handle this is up to each individual Workstream Leader, and the various tradeoffs might depend on the role they’re hiring for. But all things considered equal, getting more bang-for-the-buck would be advantageous in terms of extending runway.

thanks for the quick feedback, fren :slight_smile:

raising the 4m quorum number was brought up recently. no clue what it should be tho

Interesting to see as time has passed, seems that other things not so much. Will try and keep it short, knowing nobody likes to read about difficult things, lets meme it out!. As to the proposal this was intended for I have watched it fail so I will let that stand other than a small statement on how it could look to outsiders. Interesting that you have changed one of your core beliefs and decentralized dreams in hopes for a hail marry effort without the traffic or volumes to make it count. Also visible is the notable exemption for the major holders (one million plus) to continue to trade for free, let it be said that most working on the project have that so kudos for that. The skin in the game business, yet to be proven out so far? Sounds good, looks good on financial statements, capital raising rounds, and for those with the means to do so if they so choose, but in real world application it is like trickle down economics. Good luck, you are just standing on the backs of others with a new play.

Sorry to see the same calls for realistic acknowledgment of the state of governance still after all this time, not a priority obviously, hard topic to tackle understood but continued punts, isn’t getting anyone anywhere. A minority deciding for the DAO well can that be admitted openly? I mean many DAO’s are just fine with that why the hesitation here? I haven’t been watching so closely but I can only imagine that it is still some of the largest expenses to the DAO still pushing the “fee” and “runway” conversations at the behest of who? The small token holders, the normal traders of Shapeshift.com, the global believers in the project, or maybe the investors who need to justify the skin in the game.

Looks like another round of budget renewals are close at hand what playbook will each WorkStream choose? Seems like the blitz to the bottom has been “working”, I mean you are still here right? In the game making a real difference, trailblazing? Well maybe just holding on and that is what counts ATM for those with skin in the game.

I know I shouldn’t bother to post unless it is a solution nobody is interested. Observations, information, and difference of experience offered to be used for a community to make informed decisions and determinations isn’t helpful when you need a win fast, takes too much time and effort as a group. That’s why you have play callers, you know the ones with the most, or majority of the skin in the game trust in them to make the call when it matters.

“This is simply not true. With 30M, 40M, even 55M FOX getting voted on issues these days, it’s very safe to say that no single WSL has the ability to unilaterally decide any governance issue (unless the proposal has very little voting, in which case it’s a matter of apathy/inattention rather than a decentralization problem). IMO the DAO’s decentralization (from a governance standpoint) is actually doing great.”

I would say this is kind of a loaded statement, and would offer a different outlook or take on the situation. Yes we have had a few proposals that have garnered attention and an influx of votes, it happens mainly when leadership doesn’t wholly agree with each other or if an " outsider" puts something seen as not advantageous up for vote, in some cases even a crude flex or show of force (WorkStream renewals). The reason that you see those 40 million or so spikes is because the WorkStream leaders, teams and mobilized whales are voting their massive amounts of fox, if left to the small everyday fox holders you are not seeing those numbers by far. So I would say no the decentralization you speak of, it just isn’t the case, even if the large holders split up their fox among a few different wallet addresses. As I have seen not a lot of individual Fox holders are voting in the DAO it is a very small core group, the number of wallets as we all know doesn’t mean unique voters. Look at repeat voting addresses and even those can be deceiving, but you have blockchain and can trace it back to original locations if so desired.

As to the effect that WorkStream leaders are not directing the proposal outcomes this I see as a fallacy that for some reason the community chooses to still hide behind, not sure why other communities are fine with it or at least acknowledge it. So to this point I would say long established coalitions of leadership have been a real thing almost since the beginning of the DAO, and I understand that some worked and knew each other and had/have similar goals in mind but this has always existed, and like it or not it is a form of centralization.

To the concept that the low price of Fox is leading unique new users to purchase large amounts of Fox and then turning around and using it to vote in the DAO, is a very nice concept, but most likely it leads to existing Fox holders who are already vested in the DAO community just loading up on it more or using a proxy of someone else to further leverage or bolster capability. I am not trying to be negative if anyone feels that I would be, it is just a point that seems to be overlooked or unspoken as taboo or something.

As to the salaries I will try to leave that be, but will say that I have had that argument since the beginning but it was outside of everyones comfort zone, if you can look back and throughout my posts and of coarse if you were apart of my conversations you would see, but continually I was told it was always needed to be competitive in the space. A few years in, has this produced the expected or desired results? This ideally would be a ROI data driven and performance base determination, but of coarse it is an emotional, and personal belief and or determination that individuals will conclude as they see fit if left without standards or guidelines to hold people accountable to.

And lastly

“This is an interesting point. How to handle this is up to each individual WorkStream Leader, and the various tradeoffs might depend on the role they’re hiring for.”

The root of the problem could be stated that it begins with the WorkStream leaders themselves and the compensations that most require individually to be active in the DAO, I am not saying all. You could have a hard time tempering this issue when the leaders are so engrained, promote the individual teams “us vs them” loyalty mentality, and have accumulated the collective massive amounts of FOX as these teams and continue to move in correlation with each other to insulate themselves, this over time will only be compounded but I believe the point is made.