Thanks for the feedback @seven7hwave! Definitely agree we don’t want to drown ourselves in a sea of legalese. Hoping we can find the right balance of clear and concise language that gives sufficient power to Workstream Leaders to execute while ensuring that the community maintains ultimate authority.
Stipulation #1 is the addition I feel the strongest about. After the debate around whether Workstream Leaders have authority to override past governance decisions or whether the two words “monetize defi” in SCP-145 were sufficient to override SCP-128, I think stipulation #1 is an important clarification that will effectively derisk this or similar scenarios from occuring again. Glad you agree it’s clear and unambiguous.
I hear your concerns on Stipulation #2. That wasn’t the intention, but it’s a great example of how the same language can be interpreted in different ways. The intention wasn’t to require that Workstream Leaders get explicit permission for every action they do. Rather, it is to ensure that Workstream Leaders cannot grant themselves additional powers that haven’t been approved by governance. I hope this stipulation never comes into play, but felt that it adds worthwhile clarity in the event that a Workstream Leader(s) attempts to do this in the future. Aside from Product and Engineering’s decision to enable fees and the events that triggered SCP-92 initially, I haven’t seen any examples where Workstream Leaders have felt the need to exercise powers that hadn’t been explicitly granted to them by governance. Rather, I believe the following examples of additional powers being granted by governance rather than assumed by Workstream leaders are the right way to dao things, and hope that you and the community agree: SCP-107, SCP-113, SCP-135, the upcoming SCP-150, and moderation’s workstream proposals.
Workstream Leaders already have the following broad authorities granted to them in SCP-92:
“The Workstream Leader shall be responsible for the direction, resourcing, budget, performance, deliverables, communication, and representation of the workstream.”
I think it’s important to draw a line of where this authority ends so the argument can’t be made for instance that because a Workstream Leader is responsible for their stream’s deliverables, they can do virtually anything. I think a good place to draw that line is governance, including the existing SCP-92. If the community or Workstream Leaders wish to delegate additional authority in the future, they’re welcome to make a proposal. This will also help the community keep track of which authorities have been delegated to Workstream Leaders in case they ever want to revoke or transition this authority.
In the example of an argument being made that Workstream Leaders could not meet privately without governance approval, I would argue that the ability to meet privately with whoever you choose is not a unique power that Workstream Leaders have relative to other community members. If you or other community members still feel this Stipulation could cause more harm than good, I’m open to modifying or removing it though; please lmk what you think.
To your point on WS leaders having the authority to send their entire month budget to themselves, technically they do have this power currently and it is a real risk. While we could amend SCP-92 to say they can’t do this, unless we either remove the ‘Force’ permissions on Colony (something I do think we should do when the new version of Colony comes out soon) or migrated Workstreams to their own multisigs, there is nothing to actually stop a WS leader from doing so. Considering it’s likely that a WS leader who did do this would be swiftly removed via governance regardless of this stipulation, I’m not convinced it’s worth adding language like you suggested that prevents Workstreams from deviating from the budget outlined in their initial proposal; often Workstreams do modify their budget mid-cycle, and in general I think it makes sense to defer to the Workstreams and give them this ability without requiring additional proposals. When the force permissions are removed on Colony, Workstream contributors will have the ability to object to any payment motions created by Workstream Leaders, which I think is a nice system of checks and balances to effectively mitigate this risk.
I like the spirit of giving Workstream Leaders authority to define specific things which are time-sensitive and could cause harm to the DAO prior to community governance weighing in. On this note, I believe this is a power that the Treasury Signers have, either implicitly or explicitly; there is certainly precedent for this when the Signers removed the FOX/FOXy liquidity from Elastic Swap to protect against a potential exploit. As another system of checks and balances, I think it would be best to leave this power with the Treasury Signers rather than with a Workstream Leader or group of Workstream Leaders. That’s my initial reaction, would love to hear your any others thoughts on this.
Thanks again for the thoughtful feedback!